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I.　Introduction: social sciences fell into the trap of the Toyota Production System
In the early 1990s, the Japanese car maker, Toyota Motor Corporation (below-
mentioned Toyota), gained a good reputation thanks to its commercial successes 
in the United States, and its productive organization (Toyota Production System, 
Lean Manufacturing, just-in-time production). This fame comes from its production 
management tools – kanban (delivery and inventory control system), andon (visual 
production control device), kaïzen (permanent evolution of the productive organization) 
and others – that spawns a new managerial era, that of the systematic and continuous 
cost reduction policies embodied in the profit strategy, the product policy, the productive 
organization, and the employment relationships of Toyota and its suppliers. This 
“spirit of management” is nowadays extended to various sectors such as hospitals or 
postal services. Subsequently, the tools developed and applied in Toyota’s and its main 
suppliers’ workshops are no longer at stake. The just-in-time managerial era implies 
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the dictatorship of the market regime over that of the production of goods and services, 
sweeps the fordist temporality and its political economy, and is seen as a momentum in 
the current period of financialization of corporate governances and “regionalization” of 
industries.
Oddly enough, Toyota is no longer under scrutiny. This firm fell victim to its own 
success, the Toyota Production System. Though social scientists from various fields 
promptly analysed this managerial fashion, the firm Toyota, as a research topic, 
became less attractive throughout time. Its productive model (Boyer, Freyssenet, 2002), 
its institutional and economic environment from the 1950s to the 1980s (Cusumano, 
1985), the constraints that Toyota faces when it does not generate any margin such as 
in Western Europe (Pardi, 2011), the “humanization” of its employment relationships 
at the beginning of the 1990s (清水, 1995), the peculiarities of its Japanese inter-
corporation relations (Sako, 1992)  deserve to be reassessed from an economic 
sociological perspective. The cornerstone of this theoretical reframing is the dichotomy 
between the firm as a collective production space on the one hand, and the corporation 
as the juridical person (legal fiction) of the process of capital accumulation on the other. 
The true lessons of the “Toyota momentum” in the history of capitalism are to be drawn 
here.
II.　 Corporations and firms. Mapping out a research agenda for economic 
sociologists
In the common sense, firms, enterprises, companies, corporations are interchangeable 
words that cover a similar socioeconomic reality. Most of us believe that the modern 
firm is a recent invention, dating back to the late 19th century, with the establishment 
of the corporation and its jurisdiction (Berle, Means, 1932), the development of 
accountancy, and the growing rationalization of entire parts of our societies (in 
sociological terms), of which Max Weber was the renowned observer (Weber, 1968, 
pp.63-211). However, the concentration of labour activities into the firm, replacing the 
household as the main production sphere, is the consequence of a longer historical 
process, whose main origins are twofold.
First, the privatization of capital ownership and the issuing of shares of an 
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enterprise in order to raise funds,( 1 ) were drag routes for the jurisdiction of the modern 
corporation. Throughout an intensive and extensive evolutionary process, corporations 
shifted from “static” to “free corporate actors”, gaining not only propriety rights, but 
also that of transactions, which means to act under their own will (Coleman, 1974, 
pp.11-31). Second, merchants, while “nationalizing” local markets, propelling new 
patterns of competition, and concentrating labour activities in the late medieval period 
in Western Europe (Polanyi, 1944), dug the hole for the physical concentration of the 
labour into the workshop, the manufacture, and then the factory. These two historical 
developments gave birth to the corporation as a “juridical person” with its own 
rights on the one hand, and the firm as the collective production sphere on the other. 
Moreover, both processes deeply reshaped the feudal labour process, and molded the 
capitalist labour process.( 2 )
Nonetheless, it is easier for us to think the firm and its boundaries from their modern 
juridical typologies – joint-stock company, and so on – than from their activities, and 
the way these activities are segmented, allocated, and monitored. As a consequence, in 
the mainstream economic literature on the firm (Jensen, Meckling, 1976), agency costs 
and the corporation ownership are central pillars of the theory of the firm. In that view, 
the owners of corporations being the shareholders, and since they are the sole residual 
claimants once benefits are distributed through investments and wages, they have a 
legitimate right to control the corporation.( 3 ) Moreover, economic actions are “reified” to 
the oversimplified economic rationality of the Homo economicus, and the institutional 
environments are usually not taken into account to explain the birth, expansion, 
stabilization, and death of firms.
What should then be the contribution of economic sociologists to the theory of the 
firm? Economic sociologists have been raising their voices since the mid-1970s in 
（ 1）Without any doubt, regarding the financing of enterprises through the issuing of a company’s shares, 
the British East India Company as soon as the 17th century is a forerunner of the contemporary joint-
stock company.
（ 2）Its main characteristics are as follows: 1. No separation of necessary labour and surplus labour. 2. 
The marketization of the means of subsistence (wage) 3. The dispossession of the means of productions 
from workers. 4. The direct coordination and control of production by managers, and 5. The settlement 
of external political and legal work institutions (Burawoy, 1979, pp.14-30).
（ 3）Lynn Stout, in her book published in 2012, gives a great critical contribution to the debate on the 
shareholder value.
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order to demonstrate that this reified conception of the economy and the corporation 
does not render the true raison d’être of the firm and the variety of control patterns, 
production fields, rationale legitimates guiding the economic actions. For instance, in 
observing the evolution of the patterns of control in the United States since the second-
half of the 19th century,( 4 ) Neil Fligstein (1990)  shows that each period is marked by 
the domination of a certain profession over others, by their peculiar strategies, by the 
resources they make use of, and by their institutional embeddedness. Other economic 
sociologists such as Viviana Zelizer (1979)  and Andrew Abbott (1988), focusing on how 
markets and professions are shaped and consolidated by dominant actors, pave the 
way for economic sociologists analysing the role of firms in designing their markets (raw 
materials and machines, final products or services, labour). Such perspectives help 
us think the firms as the combination of distinct fields (accountancy, manufacturing, 
marketing, engineering, and so on)  competing with each other to claim their rights 
over the control of the firm (“outer-competition”), but also as a place where a wider 
competition arises within each field, rather than in each firm solely, or between firms 
(“inner-competition”). The objective of these rivals is to impose their own views over the 
patterns of control, the profit strategies, the productive organizations, and the product 
policies of their firms, and even their industries. As a result, from the mere theoretical 
stance of agency theory, where two actors with similar economic rationality enter into 
rivalry, an economic sociologic perspective re-establishes the enduring polymorphous 
competition patterns, and the variety of rationalities and their legitimate rationales 
that encompass the firms.
III.　Inter-firm or inter-corporation relations? United States and Japan
The firm, as the space of productive activities’ agglomeration, segmentation, 
distribution, and control, went through extremely distinct evolutionary processes 
from country to country. In the first half of the 20th century, the American large car 
makers (Ford, GM, Chrysler)  expanded through the acquisition of other corporations, 
（ 4）The four stages corporation control went through from the mid-19th century up to nowadays 
according to Fligstein are as follows: direct control of rival firms (1865-1904)  – manufacturing control 
(1904-1930s)  – marketing control (1930s-1970s)  – financial control (shareholder value)  (1970s~).
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integration and internal segmentation of a wide range of activities and their resources 
– from the purchasing of raw materials to the sale of final goods (Chandler, 1977).( 5 )  
These car makers proceeded with the outsourcing of several manufacturing segments 
and products to other corporations – i.e. suppliers – since the 1980s. Facing growing 
competition for the American market from the Japanese car makers, and in order 
to restore profitability, the shareholders dictated their boards of directors to focus 
on Margin Rates, Return on Equity, Shareholder Value, and other financial tools. By 
doing so, the less profitable manufacturing parts such as seats were outsourced to 
suppliers that in turn, in order to compete with foreign companies, also acquired other 
corporations and settled up “mega suppliers”. These processes generated specific inter-
corporation relations that many researchers classify as arm-length ones, compared 
with Japanese ones (Smitka, 1990). The centrality of prices, the importance of written 
contracts, the relatively short period of transactions, and the lack of trust characterize 
such relationships.
Oppositely, most of the Japanese car makers, with the support of the Japanese 
government and facing some historical contingencies – energy dependency that 
implies finding other tools for reducing the production costs, the Japanese plants of 
the American car makers Ford and General Motors since the 1920s, the oil shocks in 
the 1970s that were strong engines for the reshaping of the American car fleet with 
the need of smaller cars, etc. –, followed another evolutionary path.( 6 ) This path is 
mainly portrayed as externalization of various activities coupled with a strong control 
over them. In this vein, the internal control mechanisms of the Toyota corporation are 
extended far beyond its juridical boundaries (Heim, 2013). In the 1940s, as a result of 
an explicit policy of its CEO, Kiichiro Toyoda,( 7 ) Toyota favoured the externalization 
（ 5）However, General Motors Corporation, under the direction of Alfred Sloan, decided not to integrate 
the sales of cars, externalizing it through several forms of contracts with dealers in order to outsource 
some risks to the dealers and the customers (Clarke, 2007). The question of risk, along with that of 
knowledge, is central in thinking why firms internalize or outsource some processes and activities, and 
under what kind of circumstances.
（ 6）For further description and analysis of the Pre-war Japanese car industry development, refer to上
山 (2016) ; of the Post-war development up until the mid-1980s, refer to Cusumano (1985) ; and that of 
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of the production means to its main suppliers, created several new corporations as 
outgrowth of its own internal departments, while setting up several tools to monitor 
these activities. This entails the bedrock of hitherto unseen dynamics of cooperation 
and competition in the worldwide automotive industry. In gathering its main suppliers 
in a “suppliers association” (協豊会, Kyohokai, with more than 220 corporations today), 
Toyota also had to reach some compromises with its suppliers in the 1960s, such as 
dividing the suppliers’ guidance activities and the purchasing of parts, machines, 
and raw materials up into two distinct departments. With the aim of maintaining a 
strong division of labour among its suppliers, a close monitoring of their activities, 
and enforcing its cost reduction’s policies, Toyota systematically ascribed the overall 
production of a same product to three or more suppliers, strategy that the observer 
does not see developed as systematically and thoroughly by the other seven Japanese 
car makers (藤本, 2004, pp.97-98). The fierce competition among suppliers is then 
organized and monitored by Toyota that creates specific sociotechnical fields and 
assigns several corporations to each field, distributes differently its knowledge (so 
that some suppliers gain stronger learning capabilities than others), and constantly 
assesses its suppliers on their capabilities to maintain high standards of quality, 
and to reduce their manufacturing costs and the prices of their products. Often, its 
purchasing departments negotiate and acquire raw materials on a wholesale basis, 
and then provide their suppliers with those materials, even the smallest ones such 
as nuts and screws makers. In doing so, Toyota does not only reduce the purchasing 
costs of raw materials from the steelmakers, it also negotiates the prices for parts 
and components delivered by its suppliers on a per-unit cost basis, and monitors the 
productive activities of its suppliers (with the careful calculation of the scrap-rate, and 
the continual visit of the suppliers’ workshops by its engineers). Finally, rare enough 
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corporations (with a share ownership around 55%)  for more than half of its Japanese 
final car assembly (塩地／中山〔編著〕, 2016). Subcontracting covers then one of the 
remaining core business of car makers, that of final assembly. Contrary to the British 
automotive industry, where outsourcing without strong control was promoted as early 
as the 1950s (Pardi, 2017), entailing the boundaries of corporations drawing that of the 
firms, in Japan, and especially in Toyota, the boundaries of the corporations and that of 
the firms do not overlap. The challenges for the economic sociologist are to understand 
how, without necessarily financial participation but with strong manufacturing control, 
the Toyota firm is far wider than the Toyota corporation (Heim, 2009).
IV.　Toyota as an eye-catching research topic for economic sociology
This astonishing and elaborate division of labour among several corporations turns 
to be very manifest when one observes the system of transfer of Toyota’s employees 
to its suppliers. For instance, in 1999, when the Alliance between Renault and Nissan 
was established, and with the French team responsible for the Nissan’s financial and 
economic recovery taking the decision to cease the transactions with a great number 
of Nissan’s suppliers, a corporation producing engine parts lost its main client, 
Nissan, and as a result, moved towards Toyota. Within three months, and without 
any share investment into this corporation, previous Toyota top managers replaced 
the entire board of directors of this firm, and the Toyota Production System was 
enforced. Two other examples, that of the current Managing Director, Keiji Masui, of 
Toyota Auto Body, one of the mandated assembler for Toyota, and that of one of the 
current Executive Managing Advisors, Satoshi Tachihara, of JTEKT, an important 
supplier from Toyota, had both their entire careers made in Toyota, which shows the 
importance of interpersonal relationships between Toyota and some of its suppliers. 
Those are not exceptions, rather rules to reinforce physical and moral density among 
all corporations under the Toyota umbrella, or a system of transfer of senior executives 
from one corporation to another one. In Japan, this is often compared with the practice 
of Amakudari (天下り), though this term refers more often to the transfer of senior 
managers of public services to private firms. Such directors transfer systems are tricky 
challenges for the economic sociologist who is about to draw the boundaries of the 
Kyoto Journal of Sociology XXIV / December 2016
HEIM：Economic Sociology and the Theory of the Firm90
Toyota firm, since the boundaries of the firms again do not overlap with those of the 
corporation, and are therefore less constrained by the juridical framework than in the 
United States or Western Europe.
Furthermore, this system is applied to other functions than the sole managerial 
or direction ones. The classic literature on the Toyota Production System and the 
Japanese employment relationships greatly emphasized and discussed the virtues 
of seniority and lifetime employment. It is needless to say that, in practice, a small 
part of the Toyota’s overall workforce gets promoted, and in order to maintain a 
stable and young personnel, many blue-collar workers are transferred to suppliers. 
We know for instance that the average yearly salary of a graduate male worker and 
that of a secondary education graduate male worker at Aisin Seiki, an important 
supplier of brake and clutch systems, do not exceed respectively 80% and 90% of the 
wages for a same occupation at Toyota (猿田, 2007, p.459). Two types of transfer of 
employees are organized for both blue and white collar workers: shukko (出向)  and 
tenseki (転籍). In the future, a set of archives might be exploited in order to measure 
this phenomenon and its extent, and to understand its mechanisms (the corporations 
involved, the ages when transfer is decided, the assessment system, etc.). Thanks to 
this transfer system, Toyota regulates its age pyramid (the average working age in 
its Japanese plants is the lowest one among all mature countries’ car makers plants), 
maintains a high productivity per worker in its workshops, while keeping low labour 
costs and monitoring its suppliers. The Toyota’s internal labour market is therefore 
not restricted to the Toyota corporation; on the contrary, it is extended to a wide range 
of corporations (with or without share ownership). This fact also draws the economic 
sociologist’s attention towards the history of these systems of employees transfer, their 
social mechanisms, their economic functions, their extensions and boundaries, in order 
to better understand the internal labour market of the “extended Toyota firm”, and 
the historical constructions and dynamics of labour bargaining’s legal frameworks in 
Japan.
Generally speaking, two main radically opposite interpretations of these inter-
corporation relations and employment relationships are discussed. On the one hand, 
some researchers suggest that these are both a great flexible tool for Toyota, and help 
the Toyota’s closest suppliers develop their organizational and technical learning 
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(Fujimoto, 2001). On the other hand, it is argued that such a system entails a harsh 
exploitation, since this division of labour subjects the employees, and especially those 
of suppliers, to ceaseless pressures, in particular in terms of cost reductions, and 
constant refinement of quality standards (鎌田, 1973). Beyond this debate lies another 
research question regarding the dynamics between cooperation and competition. 
Though the easiest road is to think those two dynamics as contradictory ones in the 
field of labour, the Toyota case reveals their co-determination in each firm (Heim, 
2011, pp.357-377). In that respect, Toyota is still a prominent research topic in order 
to inquire and further understand these dynamics, which evolve constantly with the 
relentless technological developments in the automotive industry. Those technological 
developments are often rooted in knowledge shaped and matured in other sectors, 
which in turn brings about strong challenges for the car makers in maintaining their 
positions at the top of the automotive supply chains. A car being a “product-system” (one 
counts, depending on the car range, between 10 000 and 30 000 parts per vehicle), in the 
1980s its production needed new know-how in the plastics processing and chemistry 
sectors (for the manufacturing of seats and several innovative plastic parts replacing 
metal ones), in the 1990s and 2000s other capabilities that flourished in the electronic 
sector (the electronic revolution in the car industry drove car makers to deeply rethink 
the technical and organizational architectures of several functions such as lighting, 
break or security systems), and nowadays sound knowledge for the production of 
electric batteries, and even more important in the digital sector (in order to develop 
the Internet to Things and the software to monitor big data, which do not only apply to 
the cars but also to the manufacturing processes). During each of these technological 
evolutions, car makers showed the upmost ingenuity in order to keep their positions 
at the top of the supply chains, while other big firms such as BASF, Panasonic, Google, 
Bosch, General Electric, develop their technical solutions and destabilize the power 
balance in those chains.
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V.　Conclusion: the contribution of economic sociology to the theory of the firm
Whatever the advantages and disadvantages of this division of labour in the “large 
Toyota firm”, at the outset of the 21st century, social scientists still have much to learn 
from the Toyota firm in all its aspects (employment relationships, inter-corporation 
relations, productive organization, international expansion, profit strategy, etc.)  in 
order to better grasp the distinction between firm and corporation. Investigating 
Toyota helps redefine our everyday conception and analytical framework of the 
firm, distancing us from the sole juridical definition of the corporation and private 
ownership, and focusing attention on the field of labour, that of the collective 
productive activity and its institutions, so that thereafter one can better understand 
the interrelations between labour and capital. The very concept of division of labour 
(tasks segmentation among several corporations, and the employees transfer systems), 
the tricky dynamics between cooperation and competition (the ceaseless need of new 
know-how, and the danger that this entails for the power distribution and structure), 
the monitoring tools of the labour process (whether technical, human or financial) 
and their engendered institutions yield new challenges for social scientists. After four 
decades analysing the Toyota Production System, we still have not unveiled some of 
Toyota’s most cherished secrets, and we still have to learn from it regarding the role of 
the firm in capitalism.
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